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The COVID-19 outbreak has proved to be a critical turning point for China. Facing increasing global criticism over 
claims that it intentionally misled the world by covering up the 
true extent of the coronavirus, China has now sought to actively 
pushback against such criticism. This pushback, termed ‘Wolf 
Warrior’ diplomacy, has been noted for its propensity to call-out 
and aggressively hit back against perceived criticism against 
China. Twitter, the widely used microblogging service, is the 
platform where this new brand of Chinese diplomacy is most 
prominent. Data gleamed from the official Twitter accounts 
of various Chinese embassies and spokespersons reveal that 
official Chinese Twitter activity has gone into overdrive as a 
result of the COVID-19 pandemic, indicating China’s desire to 
influence and shape the debate via its new diplomatic strategy.
Why is China using Twitter for diplomacy?
Although virtually all of the 193 of the UN member states 
(including China) have some form of presence on Twitter, 
China is relatively new to using Twitter as a platform for 
diplomacy (“Twiplomacy”) with the official account of the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry (@MFA_China) having joined only 
as recently as 2018. Nonetheless, as the data will show, there 
has been a relative surge in the amount of Twitter activity of 
official Chinese accounts since the COVID-19 pandemic broke 
out. There are three possible intertwined reasons for China’s 
active embracement of Twitter as a platform to conduct public 
diplomacy, with all three reasons largely revolving in some way 
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The first reason is the targeted outreach 
capabilities that Twitter has to offer. 
Twitter activity is often characterized by 
the presence and prevalence of the hashtag 
(#), which allows users to ‘tag’ their posts 
to a wider conversation. Twitter therefore 
enables China to reach an international 
audience (Twitter’s userbase) rapidly and 
effectively. By utilizing the hashtag in the 
messages it puts out, China ensures that 
other Twitter users will be able to see the 
messages that its accounts put out when 
they search for the hashtag to see content 
related to it. This is regardless of whether 
these other users follow its accounts. 
Twitter also encourages brevity by limiting 
messages to only 280 characters, therefore 
affording China the necessity of skipping 
the pleasantries and getting ‘straight to the 
point’. For example, by using the #covid19 
or #coronavirus hashtag in its tweets, China 
ensures that those tweets will show up in 
the search results of those looking to see 
the latest or top tweets on COVID-19. By 
using Twitter, China is therefore afforded 
the ability to select certain topics and put 
out its viewpoints in the hope of potentially 
swaying a wide international audience.
This leads us to the second reason, which is 
Twitter allows China to monitor and gauge 
international public opinion. As Twitter 
enables China to “broadcast” to the world, 
so too can it work the other way around. 
As evidenced by the Arab Spring or China’s 
censorship of its domestic social media 
landscape, Chinese policymakers are no 
strangers to the potentially intense digital 
1  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/07/15/responding-uighur-criticism-chinese-
diplomat-points-racial-segregation-dc/
public sentiment generated when it comes 
to heralding in large-scale social changes. 
Twitter therefore serves as a platform for 
Chinese diplomats to directly monitor and 
gauge the opinion of foreign publics towards 
it. Considering that traditional media 
sources have a much longer turnaround 
time as compared to social media platforms 
like Twitter, the insights that Twitter can 
provide as the situation changes ‘on-the-
ground’ can be especially valuable at pre-
formulating responses, especially when it 
comes to a rapidly evolving event such as 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
The third reason for China’s official usage of 
Twitter is the possibility that key members 
within China’s inner policymaking circle are 
now privy to the impact the platform can 
offer when it comes to public diplomacy 
and pushing back against what China views 
as unwarranted criticism. In one famous 
example, Zhao Lijian, the former Chinese 
deputy chief-of-mission (DCM) to Pakistan, 
deflected criticism of Chinese internments 
camps in Xinjiang by making statements 
concerning the racial composition of 
neighbourhoods within the United States1. 
This provoked a heated public exchange on 
Twitter with the former US National Security 
Advisor Susan Rice. With close to 700,000 
followers on Twitter—more than any other 
official Chinese Twitter account, Zhao now 
serves as the official spokesperson of the 
Chinese MFA, an indication that his higher-
ups in Beijing are aware of the impact Twitter 
as a platform can have on its international 
messaging efforts.
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How does China’s MFA use Twitter Diplomacy?
To get a better idea of how China uses Twitter, we first looked at several official Twitter 
accounts of Chinese foreign policy entities (embassies and aid agencies). By connecting 
to Twitter’s API, we were able to access and extract the latest 3200* tweets (the maximum 
allowed) sent out by each of the following accounts:
 ■ Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@MFA_China)·
 ■ Chinese Mission to UN (@Chinamission2un)·
 ■ Chinese Embassy in US (@ChineseEmbinUS)·
 ■ Chinese Embassy in South Africa (@ChineseEmbSA)·
 ■ China Int’l Development Cooperation Agency CIDCA (@cidcaofficial)
*note that the extraction limit of 3200 tweets for each account is more than sufficient, 
considering that none of the accounts have even hit the 3200 Tweet count.
Apart from the tweets, other related data such as hashtag count, post type (tweet/retweet/
reply) and user mentions were also extracted. All the data was then compiled and analysed 
accordingly. The following are our findings:
Finding 1: Twitter is used to discuss controversial issues, especially COVID-19 
Looking at the combined all-time hashtag count of Chinese Twitter activity, we found that 
Issues where China uses hashtags tend to be controversial issues. As stated earlier, the 
use of hashtags possibly indicates a desire by China to influence the conversation. A look 
at the top hashtags used by China (visualized in the chart below) show that COVID-19 leads 
the pack followed by other controversial issues such as Hong Kong and Xinjiang with other 
issues being relatively insignificant. 
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Finding 2:  China’s narrative on Twitter 
remains tightly controlled and curated.
Looking at the type of tweets, it appears that 
most official Chinese embassy accounts 
have a weak preference for retweeting 
(52%) rather than tweeting (41%). Direct 
engagement in dialogue appears to be rare 
(7%). As for the sources of retweeting, it 
appears that these official PRC embassy 
accounts having a primary preference for 
retweeting from state-based news media 
agencies. A look at the top 15 retweet 
sources show that media outlets Xinhua 
News Agency, China Global Television 
Network (CGTN), China Daily round up the top 
three with People’s Daily and Global Times 
coming in at 7th and 8th place respectively.
2  http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0408/c90000-9041485.html
Interestingly, the preference for retweeting 
from official state media sources (which 
are vetted prior to official publication) as 
opposed to actual ambassadors seem to 
suggest the importance of retaining the 
‘core message’ or narrative. As seen with 
Zhao Lijian’s verbal confrontation with Susan 
Rice, ambassadors might veer too far ‘off-
track’ from expected standards of personnel 
conduct and diverge too much from the CCP 
party line - possibly explaining why tweets 
from ambassadors are lower in precedence 
as compared to state media sources. Other 
non- “wolf warrior” diplomats of the Chinese 
MFA had previously emphasized the need 
to steer clear of ‘extreme’ views if possible2. 
Unsurprisingly, when asked about Zhao 
Lijian’s verbal confrontation with Susan Rice, 
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the spokesman of the Chinese MFA indicated 
that the organization was not aware of the 
specifics of the situation3.
Performing time series analysis on the 
tweets to detect keywords spikes (which are 
associated with significant events) shows 
that COVID-19 related keywords only occur 
on 28 January, almost a full week after the 
lockdown was initiated in Wuhan and just 2 
days before the World Health Organization 
declared a public health emergency on 30 
January. This strongly indicates that China 
views its use of Twitter as an extension of its 
desires to shape the global debate on China 
and COVID-19. This remained pertinent in the 




considering that the Chinese Ministry of State 
Security has warned Chinese leaders that 
China faces the highest levels of global anti-
China sentiment since the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident4. Similarly, performing 
sentiment analysis (using the SentiStrength 
opinion mining algorithm5) on tweets 
since 30 Dec (when China went public with 
COVID-19) shows the language of China’s 
Twitter diplomacy to be carefully curated to 
avoid any perception of over exaggeration. 
For example, positive sentiment tended to 
be moderately-positive (91.85%) with the 
main words associated with the positive 
sentiment being: great, congratulations, 
good, hope, respect, progress etc.
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What does this mean for Chinese 
Twitter Diplomacy in the future?
Our reading of China’s Twitter diplomacy suggests that there 
are already some clear trends and even speculative avenues 
for understanding how China might use Twitter for diplomacy 
in the near future. 
First, the usage of Twitter diplomacy is effectively a ‘crisis 
messaging tool’ for Beijing. The global nature of the issue 
and its immediate strategic importance to China defines the 
necessity of utilising the Twitter to shape the emerging debate 
on a given topic, given how Twitter is the “preferred channel” for 
conducting digital diplomacy.6 
Due to widespread domestic7 and international criticism over 
its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s carefully crafted 
image of itself as a capable global leader was in danger of 
receding8. Faced with momentous pressure to push back 
against an anti-CCP narrative, the Chinese authorities have 
sought to use Twitter as a vital instrument in their efforts to do 
so. Twitter provided an instrument for swift, targeted rebuttals 
that reached a global audience in near real-time. Twitter has 
served as a platform through which China can push out swift 
and targeted rebuttals in real-time, all whilst reaching a global 
audience. Twitter diplomacy has therefore given China some 
much-needed breathing room. We note that as the COVID-19 
crisis has ‘normalised’ in recent months—arguably a mark of 
China’s relatively successful transition out of crisis—and the 
focus has shifted to other countries’ management of the crisis, 
this has allowed other issues is creep up the agenda. As a 
result, Beijing’s use of Twitter diplomacy has similarly become 
routine, and the accompanying volume of traffic related to 
the COVID-19 pandemic has decreased in comparison from 
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continue, with China’s Twitter activism surging in line with its 
perceived necessity of managing the crisis narrative of a given 
issue. Doing so will allow Chinese authorities to potentially pre-
empt any unfavourable narratives from gaining momentum. 
Secondly, despite MFA’s granting of a measure of autonomy 
to ambassadors to communicate with the foreign public9, 
the logic of the top-down party hierarchy, in many ways 
reflective of Xi Jinping’s centralization of power, seems to 
have prevailed. Ambassadors who have developed distinctive 
voices over the last twenty or so months by entering into 
the national dialogue of their resident countries via Twitter, 
are becoming less evident. The most vocal of the “wolf-
warriors”, Zhao Lijian and Lin Songtian, have been recalled 
back to lead various key departments of China’s foreign 
diplomacy apparatus. For example, Lin Songtian is now the 
president of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship 
with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), an organization known as 
the “public face” of the Communist Party’s United Work Front 
Department.10 This indicates a conscious decision on the part 
of the party leadership to reign in such ambassadors while still 
retaining the benefits that “wolf-warrior” diplomacy provides. 
Additionally, what is notably absent to date in the Chinese 
approach to Twitter diplomacy is the kind of individual 
messaging pursued by national leaders, most notably with 
Trump but also many others. India’s Narendra Modi, Turkey’s 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad 
are good examples.11 It seems certain that a modern-day 
Mao Zedong, well-published in his day and whose legacy is 
undebated amongst Communist Party members, would have 
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Finally, in an era of global power competition and the growing 
trend towards a ‘splinternet’ in the digital world, how will this 
affect China’s Twitter diplomacy? Will the regulatory regimes 
currently being discussed and possibly implemented by 
the West’s social media giants impact China’s use of this 
platform? If so, how? Irrespective, it is hard to imagine that 
Beijing, having recognised the power of Twitter diplomacy in 
shaping global public opinion towards China on COVID-19, 
will not find a means of engaging audiences on social media 
to convey its messages in the future. 
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This Strategic Update explores how official 
Chinese foreign policy entities have used Twitter 
as a public diplomacy platform during the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the nature 
of their Twitter activity, and what this means 
for Chinese Twitter Diplomacy in the future.
Twitter and Digital Diplomacy:  
China and COVID-19
CHRIS ALDEN AND KENDDRICK CHAN
Cover image: 
Pete Linforth from Pixabay
For general enquiries:
LSE IDEAS
Floor 9, Pankhurst House 
1 Clement’s Inn, London 
WC2A 2AZ
+44 (0)20 7849 4918
ideas@lse.ac.uk
lse.ac.uk/ideas
@lseideas
lseideas
